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ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
The American Health Care Act 
Would Toss the States a Hot Potato
by David Gamage and Darien Shanske
Healthcare reform has been dominating recent 
policy discussions, even more so than proposals for 
tax reform. On March 6 House Republicans finally 
revealed their draft bill to repeal and replace the 
Affordable Care Act. That bill was subsequently 
revised, with a House vote then scheduled for 
March 24, before that vote was canceled because 
of lack of support. The immediate news following 
that canceled vote was that the Republicans would 
be abandoning their goal of repealing and 
replacing the Affordable Care Act. However, more 
recent news stories suggest that the American 
Health Care Act (AHCA) may still live, and that 
House Republicans may try again to pass this bill 
or something resembling it.
Because the major provisions and structure of 
the AHCA may be enacted in some future 
legislative effort, it is worth analyzing the 
implications that this would have for state-level tax 
and health policy. In this article, we argue that 
passage of the AHCA in anything like its current 
form would toss a hot potato to state governments 
by forcing them to act promptly if they are to save 
individual insurance markets in their states. This 
article explains the problem so that state-level 
policymakers can be prepared to act quickly if the 
AHCA is passed. The most promising state 
government responses to the AHCA would involve 
passing new state-level taxes and subsidies. Hence, 
state-focused tax policy communities should be 
prepared for state governments to act.
To assess the AHCA bill, it is helpful to think of 
it as consisting of four major buckets of reform:
• ending many of the ACA’s tax provisions;
• phasing in cuts to Medicaid funding and
scheduling devolution of Medicaid to the
states;
• transforming the ACA’s other major health
subsidies from being based mostly on income 
and health costs to being based more on age;
and
• making other changes to the ACA’s insurance 
market regulations.
This essay focuses on the fourth bucket — the 
changes to the ACA’s insurance market regulations 
other than the changes to subsidies. The AHCA’s 
Medicaid reforms would also create challenges for 
state governments, but explaining those challenges 
is not the topic of this essay.
David Gamage is a professor of law at 
Indiana University Maurer School of Law and 
Darien Shanske is a professor at the University 
of California Davis School of Law (King Hall).
In this edition of Academic Perspectives on 
SALT, the authors discuss potential state 
responses should the Republican replacement 
for the Affordable Care Act be enacted. They 
write that states must begin their preparations 
immediately, since they will need to quickly 
close the gaps created by those federal actions.
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What is most striking about the AHCA’s 
insurance market changes is how they keep nearly 
all the ACA’s reforms in place. Right-wing groups 
have thus called the AHCA “Obamacare lite.”1 Yet, 
in a sense, this is a misnomer. The AHCA’s changes 
do not really water down the ACA’s regulations, as 
the intended slur Obamacare lite implies. Rather, 
the AHCA’s changes would likely cause the ACA’s 
framework for regulating the individual market to 
fall apart — absent countervailing actions by state 
governments.
If the AHCA bill were enacted in its current 
form, the result would likely be adverse-selection 
death spirals. The only real hope for saving the 
individual market would be for state governments 
to step up with new state-level regulations for 
supporting insurance markets in their state.
The AHCA retains the ACA’s bans against 
insurance plans denying coverage or charging 
more to people with preexisting health conditions. 
This means that the individual market for health 
insurance would not function based on an actuarial 
fairness model, wherein people would be charged 
based on their expected future healthcare costs. 
Instead, the individual market would function 
based on a risk-pooling model.
Any risk-pooling model for health insurance 
needs mechanisms for coping with adverse 
selection.2 Absent those mechanisms, healthier 
Americans would likely opt for cheaper, more 
bare-bones health insurance plans, or to forgo 
purchasing health insurance altogether. This 
would then leave more comprehensive health 
insurance plans covering sicker and more costly 
populations, which would lead insurance 
companies to raise the prices on these plans or to 
restrict the benefits that are more attractive to sick 
insureds. The iteration of these dynamics generally 
leads to adverse-selection death spirals that can 
cause insurance markets to collapse into only bare-
bones plans or even no plans at all.
The ACA dealt with these dynamics through 
the individual mandate, actuarial value 
requirements, essential health benefits 
requirements, other restrictions banning bare-
bones health plans, and risk-adjustment systems 
that charge health insurance plans with less costly 
pools of insureds while compensating plans with 
more costly pools of insureds.3 Many argue that 
these ACA measures were insufficient and that 
adverse selection death spirals are beginning to 
develop in at least some states.4 To the extent that is 
correct, the only possible solutions are:
• some combination of toughening the 
penalties for going without insurance 
coverage and the restrictions on bare-bones 
insurance plan offerings or implementing 
stronger risk-adjustment and subsidization 
mechanisms to bolster more comprehensive 
insurance offerings; or
• moving away from the risk-pooling model 
and toward either an actuarial fairness model 
or a single-payer model.
Yet the AHCA does none of these. As noted, the 
AHCA continues to rely on the risk-pooling model 
by preventing insurance plans from charging more 
or denying coverage to insureds with preexisting 
conditions. Then, instead of strengthening the 
ACA’s provisions for limiting adverse selection, the 
AHCA dramatically weakens these provisions. 
Most notably, the AHCA replaces the ACA’s 
individual mandate with a (laughably lenient) 
continuous coverage requirement5 while also 
repealing the ACA’s actuarial value requirements 
and — in some later versions — essential health 
benefits requirements.
In other words, the AHCA would allow 
healthy people to purchase cheap, bare-bones 
insurance plans or to forgo purchasing insurance 
altogether. Then, when these people become sick 
and need greater coverage, they could switch to a 
1
See, e.g., Maggie Fox, “Obamacare Lite? New GOP Health Care 
Bill Has Host of Critics,” NBCNews.com, Mar. 7, 2017.
2
See David Gamage, “Perverse Incentives Arising From the Tax 
Provisions of Healthcare Reform: Why Further Reforms Are 
Needed to Prevent Avoidable Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income 
Workers,” 65 Tax L. Rev. 669, 676-680 (2012), available at https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2067138.
3
Id. at 683-685.
4
See, e.g., Megan McArdle, “Obamacare Isn’t Going to Fix 
Itself,” Bloomberg View, Mar. 16, 2017.
5
For discussion, see, e.g., Aaron Carroll, “The AHCA’s Mandate 
Replacement Doesn’t Make Sense to Me,” The Incidental 
Economist Blog (Mar. 10, 2017). Leaving aside the effectiveness of 
this requirement, it may represent a change to the law that cannot 
be made by means of reconciliation. See Daniel Hemel and David 
Herzig, “The G.O.P. Health Care Plan’s Fatal Flaw,” The New York 
Times, Mar. 16, 2017.
(C) Tax Analysts 2017. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
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more comprehensive health insurance plan, 
paying no penalty if they are switching from a 
bare-bones plan or paying just 30 percent more for 
a year if they are switching from no coverage.
This is simply not enough incentive for healthier 
people to purchase more comprehensive insurance 
plans from the individual market. If enacted, the 
AHCA would thus result in more comprehensive 
insurance plans being swamped with high-cost 
insureds with expensive health conditions, which 
would then create overwhelming pressure for 
insurance providers to either restrict the features of 
plans that appeal to high-cost insureds or withdraw 
from the market altogether. To illustrate, consider 
what insurance provider would want to create a 
plan that offers great cancer coverage, if the result 
would be to attract extremely high cost cancer 
patients, without being able to either charge them 
higher premiums or to otherwise be reimbursed 
for their greater cost?
Were the AHCA enacted in its current form, the 
best hope for saving individual insurance markets 
would be for state governments to step up and pass 
state-level regulations to make up for the AHCA’s 
weaknesses. Nothing currently prevents state 
governments from implementing their own 
individual mandates; or even better, state 
governments could directly subsidize exchange 
plans to make the individual mandate 
unnecessary, along with implementing better, 
state-level risk adjustment mechanisms.
Before discussing how state governments 
should respond to the AHCA, it is worth 
reiterating that the AHCA is a draft bill and its 
framework could be made workable without state 
government action. Joseph Antos and James 
Capretta explain one way this could be done.6 Their 
proposed approach would involve, among other 
measures, greatly increasing the continuous 
coverage requirement penalties. They write:
The AHCA penalty imposed on persons 
who experience a break in their insurance 
enrollment of more than two months in the 
prior year would be a 30 percent premium 
surcharge payable for 12 months. For a 
plan costing $6,000 a year, that amounts to 
a surcharge of $150 a month. Healthy 
consumers are likely to take their chances, 
saving that $6,000 in the hope that they 
would not incur significant medical 
expenses during the year. With the repeal 
of the individual mandate, and the 
retention of the ACA’s insurance rules, the 
overall effect would be significant market 
turbulence, starting immediately in 2017.
To avoid a complete collapse of the market, 
the AHCA should provide a strong and 
clear penalty for persons who exit the 
market, covering multiple years. One 
approach would be to extend the current 
surcharge over several years. Another 
possibility would be to impose a waiting 
period before benefits would be paid.
More generally, the AHCA may not pass or 
may be so substantially revised by the time it 
passes so as to resolve the problems we identify in 
this article. But there is a non-trivial risk of the 
AHCA passing in something like its current form. 
So state governments and state tax policy 
communities should be prepared to act if needed.
Perhaps the most straightforward option for 
how state governments could respond to the 
AHCA would be to legislate state-level individual 
mandates. Indeed, health law scholar Nicholas 
Bagley has proposed just that. In an op-ed focused 
on California, he wrote:
For 2018 and 2019, almost every part of 
Obamacare except for the individual 
mandate will remain intact. California can 
patch that hole by replacing the individual 
mandate at the state level. Call it the 
Golden State Mandate.
The Legislature would have to act fast. The 
substitute mandate probably would have 
to be in place by the summer in order to 
give insurers time to set their rates before 
the start of open enrollment on Nov. 1. Even 
then, the gambit might not work: Insurers 
are skittish about the long-term future of 
health reform. Some may head for the hills.
But the California exchange is healthy and, 
with a substitute mandate in place, the 
economic picture for the next two years 
shouldn’t look all that different than it does 
today. Instead of the premium surge that 
other states will experience, California 
6
Antos and Capretta, “Republicans Should Take the Time 
Necessary to Improve the American Health Care Act,” Health 
Affairs Blog (Mar. 10, 2017).
(C) Tax Analysts 2017. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.
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residents could see a more moderate 
increase in premiums. At a minimum, it’s 
worth a shot.7
Bagley’s proposal for state-level individual 
mandates could work, at least in theory. Yet the 
individual mandate has always been among the 
least popular of the provisions in the ACA 
framework. Even the Obama administration was 
lukewarm about enforcing the mandate and was 
arguably unwilling to give it sufficient teeth. We 
are thus skeptical that state governments would 
have the political will to successfully implement 
this approach — even in California.8
So what might state governments do instead? 
The best solution would probably be to implement 
state-level versions of the ACA’s reinsurance and 
risk corridor programs but to make them 
permanent, in contrast to their temporary, 
transitional role in the ACA regulatory 
framework.9 This approach would involve levying 
taxes on group and self-funded health insurance 
plans and on individual health plans with 
healthier, lower-cost pools of insureds, and then 
using these funds to compensate individual health 
plans that attract higher-cost pools of insureds for 
the excess coverage costs.10
Implementing state-level reinsurance and risk 
corridor programs would not be simple. Nor 
would implementing any alternative approach 
capable of saving individual insurance markets in 
the states. Preparatory work would probably need 
to be started even before the AHCA became law. 
Some issues that would need to be worked through 
include:
• ensuring that the overall subsidization of 
exchange plans (or other individual market 
plans) would be sufficient to make up for the 
lack of an individual mandate;
• managing the likely erosion of employer-
sponsored coverage that would result from 
the subsidization of individual market plans 
in the absence of an employer mandate;11 and
• designing anti-fraud and anti-gaming 
mechanisms to limit the potential for 
insurance providers to manipulate the new 
programs against the public interest.
Will state governments be up to managing 
these challenges? If the AHCA is not passed, we 
may never know. If the AHCA does pass, we can 
only hope. No doubt the states have bought some 
time with the collapse of the AHCA repeal effort, 
but this reprieve may only be temporary. There are 
also indications that the administration may 
undermine the ACA through administrative 
action, which means that the states may end up 
with the same hot potato even without formal 
repeal of the ACA.12 We therefore believe that it is 
crucial for state tax policy communities to begin 
preparatory work soon.13 Only through such action 
will state governments be able to handle the hot 
potato tossed to them by the federal government 
without being burned. 
7
Bagley, “The GOP Obamacare Replacement Would Help the 
Rich, Hurt the Poor and Unleash Chaos,” Los Angeles Times, Mar. 7, 
2017.
8
There have been serious efforts to establish a single-payer 
system in California in the past and similar discussions have begun 
again. See, e.g., Soumya Karlamangla, “With Obamacare in 
Jeopardy, California Considers Going It Alone With ‘Single-
Payer,’” Los Angeles Times, Feb. 26, 2017.
9
See Cynthia Cox et al., “Explaining Health Care Reform: Risk 
Adjustment, Reinsurance, and Risk Corridors,” The Henry J. Kaiser 
Family Foundation (Aug. 17, 2016).
10
An alternative approach that should also be considered 
would be to implement a state-level high-risk pool in a manner 
designed to achieve the result of subsidizing more comprehensive 
individual market plans. Maine’s experience in 2011 offers a model 
for how this could be done. For discussion, see Joel Allumbaugh, 
Tarren Bragdon, and Josh Archambault, “Invisible High-Risk 
Pools: How Congress Can Lower Premiums and Deal With Pre-
Existing Conditions,” Health Affairs Blog (Mar. 3, 2017).
11
See Hemel, “The House GOP Plan and Employer-Sponsored 
Health Insurance: Killing It Softly?” Whatever Source Derived Blog 
(Mar. 10, 2017), for preliminary analysis on this issue. See Gamage, 
supra note 2, at 692-693, for a discussion of this issue under the 
ACA. A major reason why federal policymakers were concerned 
about the potential erosion of employer-sponsored coverage when 
legislating and implementing the ACA was that it could have 
dramatically driven up the budgetary cost of the exchange 
subsidies. From a state government perspective, were the AHCA to 
be passed and implemented, this would arguably be a plus, since 
the more that state government policy shifted insureds from 
employer-sponsored coverage to subsidized individual market 
coverage, the larger the subsidies the federal government would 
provide to the state and the stronger the state’s individual market 
would likely become (at the federal government’s expense).
12
Juliet Eilperin and Mike Debonis, “Price: Trump 
Administration plans to undo parts of the Affordable Care Act,” 
Chicago Tribune, Mar. 29, 2017.
13
We plan to return to the topic with some ideas and 
observations in a future essay.
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